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Majority Rule, Minority Rights, and the Right to
Vote: Reflections Upon a Reading of Minority
Vote Dilution
Philip P. Frickey*
A modem prophet translated the biblical injunction to possess the truth, for "the truth shall make you free,"' into a vision in
which the instrument of freedom is the vote rather than the truth.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. articulated the basis of much of the
early civil rights movement when he stated: "Voting is the foundation stone for political action. With it the Negro can vote out of
office public officials who bar the doorway to decent housing, public safety, jobs, and decent integrated education."2 Acknowledge
and protect our constitutional rights to register and to vote, Dr.
King suggested, and we will not only respect existing American institutions, we will use them to defeat racism fairly and squarely.
This philosophy, linked so inexorably to the twin American
ideologies of the vote as the most basic of all rights and of resolving social conflict through established political channels, served as
the premise for one of our most important civil rights statutes, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.3 In addition, this philosophy led the
federal courts in the 1970s to adopt interpretations of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments that strove to break down barriers preventing the minority community from participating
meaningfully in the political process.4 These decisions attempted
to remedy the worst instances of "minority vote dilution." They
recognized that when certain electoral structures, such as at-large
elections, were coupled with severe racial bloc voting, even a sub* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author thanks
Dan Farber, John Matheson, Cass Sunstein, and Gerald Torres for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1. John 8:32 (King James).
2. Quoted in Milton Morris, Black Electoral Participationand the Distribution of Public Benefits, in Minority Vote Dilution 271 (Chandler Davidson ed.
1984).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
4. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd on other grounds sub nom East Carroll
Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
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stantial minority community could not elect any officeholders.
More recently, after the Supreme Court rejected any meaningful
constitutional protection of minority political participation,5 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to provide a statutory basis
6
for that right.
A recent collection of essays entitled Minority Vote Dilution ,7 edited by Professor Chandler Davidson, a sociologist at Rice
University, addresses these developments and analyzes several important issues of minority voting rights on the horizon of the law.
On the whole, the essays are thoughtful and informative, and the
collection should be of interest to both the specialist and the
novice.
Moreover, the essays provide a springboard for an assessment
of many aspects of minority voting rights. The combination of
ideas, ideology, and idealism that surrounds voting issues is fascinating. Discussions of minority voting rights can proceed on many
planes-e.g., the empirical, the philosophical, the symbolic--and
involve many sensitive questions. My own vision of minority voting rights was sharpened by reading the writings collected in Minority Vote Dilution, and this essay is an attempt to present
several snapshots of what I see. My hope is that my reflections on,
and beyond, the material in Minority Vote Dilution may contribute something to the diverse stream of thinking in an area of immense philosophical and empirical complexity as well as great
practical importance.
A short background in the Voting Rights Act and the constitutional decisions protecting minority voting rights is essential to
an understanding of this topic, and I devote the next section to
these subjects. I will then assess several of the more important essays in Minority Vote Dilution. Finally, I will conclude with some
broader ruminations on minority voting rights that have been provoked, at least in part, by reading these essays.
I.
The Voting Rights Act identified areas of this country where
voting discrimination was rampant 8 and proposed two types of
5. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
6. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131,
134.
7. Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 2.
8. Section 4(b), 79 Stat. 438, provided that the Act applied to:
any State or ... any political subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any test
or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census de-
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remedies. First, to facilitate minority registration and voting, the
statute outlawed discriminatory voter registration requirements
and made available both federal examiners-to register minority
voters when local voting registrars refused to act in a nondiscriminatory fashion-and federal election observers to stand watch at
the polls. 9 Second, the Act was designed to protect this newly won
minority electoral strength from schemes designed to limit or reduce it. Accordingly, the statute prohibited covered jurisdictions
from implementing new electoral devices without first obtaining
"preclearance": a determination from either the United States Department of Justice or a three-judge court of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia that the new electoral
rule was not tainted by a discriminatory purpose and did not have
a discriminatory impact upon minority voting power.' 0 The Act
provided a method by which a covered jurisdiction could "bail out"
of the Act's coverage, but in practice the right to bail out proved
more illusory than real.11
termines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than
50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1964.
Section 4(c), 79 Stat. 438-39, defined "test or device" as
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand,
or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement
or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral
character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered
voters or members of any other class.
Although the coverage formula is expressed in neutral terms, when applied it
brought the entire Deep South within its sweep.
9. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 3(a), 3(b), 4, 6-10, 79 Stat.
437-43 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a(a)-(b), 1973b, 1973d-1973h (1982)).
10. Id. § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982)).
11. Id. § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1982)),
provided that a covered jurisdiction could bail out of the Act's coverage if:
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision
against the United States has determined that no such test or device
has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color- Provided, That no such declaratory
judgment shall issue with respect to any plaintiff for a period of five
years after the entry of a final judgment of any court of the United
States, other than the denial of a declaratory judgment under this section, whether entered prior to or after the enactment of this Act, determining that denials or abridgments of the right to vote on account
of race or color through the use of such tests or devices have occurred
anywhere in the territory of such plaintiff.
The renewals of the Act in 1970 and 1975 correspondingly extended the original
five-year period set forth in this section. See Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 315
(1970); Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat. 400 (1975).
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, all cities and counties in a covered state
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The 1965 statute provided that these remedies would be in effect for five years.' 2 In 1970, Congress renewed the Act for an-4
other five years, 1 3 and in 1975 it added another seven-year term.'
Most recently, Congress in 1982 extensively amended the Act and
renewed these remedies for another twenty-five years.15
The Supreme Court found no constitutional flaw in the 1965
6
In addition, the Court has generally construed the Act
Act.'
broadly to effectuate its remedial purposes. In perhaps the most
important decision, the Court held that even a minor change in an
electoral scheme of a covered jurisdiction had to be "precleared" in
7
Washington before implementation.'
The electoral devices that create the most problems for minority voting strength, however, are not minor in character. Perhaps the most obvious electoral structure that weakens minority
voting power is the use of at-large, rather than ward, electoral
structures in a jurisdiction in which racial bloc voting is prevalent
and the minority community is geographically concentrated. In
such a jurisdiction, the candidates supported by the white bloc-voting majority are assured of winning all offices, and the candidates
supported only by the bloc-voting minority community have no
chance of success. Conversely, if ward elections were held, the geographically concentrated racial minority would have a far better
opportunity to elect at least some candidates of their choice. Because of the obvious discriminatory effect created by at-large electoral systems in an environment of racial bloc voting, preclearance
has been routinely denied to a covered jurisdiction that wished to
were subject to the Act and could not bail out individually. See City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 162-70 (1980). Thus, the only method by which such a
locality could escape the Act is if the state in which it is located brought a successful bail-out action. Under the plain language of section 4(a) a covered state could
bail out only if it showed something that no southern state could possibly prove:
that no test or device had been used anywhere within its borders for the purpose or
with the effect of disadvantaging the minority vote. The practical result was that
the states of the Deep South and their political subdivisions were locked into the
Act.
The 1982 amendments to the Act include a less rigid bail-out mechanism that
took effect in 1984. See Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 131-34 (1982). See generaly S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-62 (1982); Richard Williamson, The
1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act A Statutory Analysis of the Revised
Bailout Provisions, 1984 Wash. U.L.Q. 1.
12. See supra note 11.
13. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 315.
14. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat.
400.
15. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, supra note 6.
16. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
17. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). In addition, see Perkins
v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) (preclearance required for moving polling places).

1985]

MINORITY VOTE DILUTION

change from a ward system to an at-large system of electing
officeholders.18
The Voting Rights Act as adopted in 1965 and as extended in
1970 and 1975 prohibited only certain barriers to registration and
voting, such as the literacy test, and changes in electoral rules in
certain geographical areas that are discriminatory in purpose or effect; the Act did not reach preexisting electoral structures that disadvantaged minorities but did not deny them the opportunity to
register and to vote. Thus, the Act did not affect at-large electoral
schemes that were in place at the time of its effective date. Such
schemes were prevalent in the South long before the Act was
adopted, and minority plaintiffs wishing to attack them had to look
beyond the Act to the Constitution. The fifteenth amendment's
mandate that the right to vote shall not be "denied or abridged"
on account of race,19 as well as the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, became the grounds relied upon by the
Supreme Court, in White v. Regester,20 and by lower courts2 ' to invalidate at-large electoral schemes. These schemes, when coupled
with demonstrable racial bloc voting and perhaps other electoral
devices disproportionally disadvantaging the minority vote, froze
the minority community out of the political process.
A fair reading of White and of the major lower court interpretation of it, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Zimmer v.
McKeithen ,22 demonstrates that these decisions were based on the
discriminatory effect of the electoral schemes at issue, rather than
on any consideration of whether those schemes had been adopted
or maintained for discriminatory reasons. 23 However, three years
after White was decided, the Supreme Court held, in Washington
v. Davis ,24 that a facially neutral law that disproportionally disadvantaged a racial minority was invalid under the equal protection
18. See Frank Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 2, at 102.
19. Section 1 of the fifteenth amendment provides that "[t]he right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
20. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
21. For a summary of such cases, see Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House

Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 493-547 (1981) (prepared statement of Frank Parker).
22. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd on other grounds sub nom.
East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
23. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 19-24; Note, Racial Vote Dilution
in Multimember Districts: The ConstitutionalStandardAfter Washington v. Davis, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 694, 699-701 (1978).
24. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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clause only if it were shown that the law was tainted by a discriminatory purpose. The Court in Washington v. Davis made no effort
to clarify whether White v. Regester was consistent with the new
rule it announced.
The judicial treatment of the Act and of the constitutional
protection against vote dilution remained largely favorable to minority interests until 1980, when the statutory and constitutional
paths drastically diverged. On the same day in April of that year
the Supreme Court decided City of Rome v. United States25 and
City of Mobile v. Bolden .26 Rome upheld the constitutionality of
the 1975 extension of the Voting Rights Act and affirmed a lower
court's refusal to grant preclearance to a variety of electoral
changes in Rome, Georgia, that would have had a discriminatory
effect upon minority voting strength. In contrast, Mobile, for all
practical purposes, gutted the constitutional right to be free from
racial vote dilution.
At issue in Mobile was the constitutionality of the at-large
electoral scheme long used to choose city commissioners in Mobile,
Alabama. Although Blacks made up about one-third of Mobile's
population, they had never elected a city commissioner because of
the presence of rock-hard racial bloc voting. A plurality of the
Supreme Court in Mobile first concluded that no fifteenth amendment claim was present because that amendment outlaws only devices that interfere with minority registration or voting, and not
devices that disproportionally disadvantage minority citizens who
may register and vote without hindrance. 27 Second, the plurality
recast White v. Regester into a case involving purposeful racial discrimination and announced that the intent requirement of Washington v. Davis controlled the construction of the equal protection
clause even in a vote-dilution case. 28 Thus, the plurality concluded
that Blacks in Mobile were not entitled to relief unless they
demonstrated that the at-large electoral system had been adopted
or maintained for discriminatory purposes. 29
25. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
26. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
27. Id at 61-65 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).

28. Id. at 65-80.
29. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the plurality
opinion of Justice Stewart. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, concluding that although there was a constitutional violation the district court's imposition
of single-member districting was an abuse of discretion. Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment, and his views are discussed in the text accompanying notes
85-97. Justice White dissented, asserting that there was sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to affirm the judgment of the district court. Justice Marshall
also dissented. Marshall argued that a showing of intentional discrimination was
not required by either the fourteenth or the fifteenth amendments, and that if in-
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The Mobile decision provoked enormous controversy in the
civil rights community. A drive to change the result in Mobile by
statute became linked to the lobbying effort to renew the Voting
Rights Act, which was set to expire in 1982. In a legislative victory
as monumental as it was surprising, supporters of minority voting
rights convinced Congress to renew the basic remedies of the Act
and to amend the Act to provide statutory protection in the context of minority vote dilution that is in large part equivalent, and
in some ways superior, to the discriminatory-impact approach of
White v. Regester and Zimmer v. McKeithen. As amended, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner that results in the
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention
of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members
of the protected class have been elected to office in the State
or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this subsection establishes a
in numbers
right to have members of a protected class elected
30
equal to their proportion in the population.
Ironically, two days after President Reagan signed this legislation the Supreme Court decided Rogers v. Lodge. 3 1 The Court
avoided the question whether the plurality in Mobile was correct
in concluding that vote-dilution claims are not cognizable under
the fifteenth amendment, 32 but it did accept the Mobile plurality's
conclusion that proof of discriminatory intent was necessary to establish a vote-dilution claim under the equal protection clause.33
The Court in Rogers, however, upheld the factual findings of the
tentional discrimination must be proved the evidence was sufficient on that score to
affirm the district court. Justice Brennan filed a short dissenting opinion agreeing
with the conclusions of Justice Marshall.
30. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131,
134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)) (emphasis added). Section 4(f)(2), cited in
section 2(a), concerns language minorities.
31. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
32. Id at 619 n.6.
33. Id. at 616-22.
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district court, affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, that the maintenance
by local officials of an at-large electoral scheme in Burke County,
Georgia unconstitutionally diluted the Black vote. Much of the evidence relied upon by the lower courts was similar to, although
perhaps starker than, the evidence in Mobile, and Justice Powell
in dissent complained: "Whatever the wisdom of Mobile, the
Court's opinion cannot be reconciled persuasively with that case.
There are some variances in the largely sociological evidence
presented in the two cases. But Mobile held that this kind of evidence was not enough." 34
There is some force to Powell's lament. Rogers is a classic example of a narrowly written opinion affirming the lower courts: it
stresses that the legal standard applied by the lower courts was at
least facially consistent with that announced in the plurality opinion in Mobile and that the Supreme Court hesitates to overturn
the factual findings of two lower courts. One is left with the impression that the majority in Rogers lacked the desire either to engage in the detailed factual review Mobile seems to suggest or to
reconsider whether the legal standard proposed by the Mobile plurality is appropriate.
II.

This history provides the backdrop for my examination of the
essays in Minority Vote Dilution. The essays were commissioned
by the Joint Center for Political Studies, a civil rights "think
tank." Not surprisingly, every essay lies in the mainstream of civil
rights thought and tradition and is imbued with Dr. Martin Luther
King's view of the central importance of the vote to equality. Several of the authors are academics-political scientists, sociologists,
or historians-who have brought their disciplines to bear on the
difficult historical and empirical questions involved in minority
vote dilution. The other authors are civil rights lawyers, who have
avoided the pitfalls of recounting great cases they have won (or
lost) and instead presented interesting and useful legal analyses of
minority voting issues.
A.
Three empirical studies are of special interest. For newcomers to this area, the introduction by Chandler Davidson is a useful
35
overview of electoral devices that can dilute the minority vote.
34. I& at 629 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
35. Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in Minority
Vote Dilution, supra note 2, at 1-23.
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Throughout this essay I have focused exclusively on at-large elections, and problems of minority vote dilution usually are associated
with that electoral system. Other electoral devices also can diminish the minority vote, however, and Davidson identifies a number
of those devices and explains why they can have such a discriminatory impact.36 He also provides a helpful introduction to the writings that follow.
In another essay, Davidson, in collaboration with George Korbel, reviews the empirical studies on the question of whether atlarge elections actually dilute minority voting strength. 37 Davidson and Korbel demonstrate that these studies almost unanimously conclude that across the United States at-large elections
have this discriminatory effect, and they explain why the few studies that suggest the contrary are not trustworthy. In addition, Davidson and Korbel present new empirical data suggesting that
minorities fared better at the polls in those Texas jurisdictions
that changed from at-large electoral systems to ward or mixed systems between 1970 and 1979. This study, which first appeared in a
respected political science journal,38 removes any lingering doubt
about whether at-large elections have demonstrable discriminatory
effects.
Finally, Davidson joined with Luis Ricardo Fraga to examine
the discriminatory effect that can arise when a nonpartisan slating
group controls the nomination of candidates in an at-large electoral scheme.3 9 The authors make no attempt to present a systematic, statistically significant study of this question, but rather rely
on case studies of the political process in four Texas cities: Abilene, Wichita Falls, Dallas, and San Antonio. These histories bring
to mind Floyd Hunter's venerable "power elite" case study of Atlanta community politics in the 1940s.4 0 According to Davidson
36. Davidson analyzes the vote-dilutive effects of at-large elections, runoff requirements, anti-single-shot devices, decreasing the size of elected governmental
bodies, exclusive slating groups, and gerrymandering. I& at 5-9.

37. Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority
Group
dence,
38.
Group
dence,
39.

Representation. A Re-examination of Historical and Contemporary Eviin Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 2, at 65-81.
Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority
Representation. A Re-examination of Historical and Contemporary Evi43 J. Pol. 982 (1981).
Chandler Davidson & Luis Ricardo Fraga, NonpartisanSlating Groups in

an At-Large Setting, in Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 2, at 119-43. Davidson

and Fraga define "nonpartisan slating group" as "an organization whose purpose is
to recruit candidates, nominate them, and campaign for their election to office in a
nonpartisan election system." Id. at 119.
40. See Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (1953). See also Robert
Lynd & Helen Lynd, Middletown in Transition (1937) (examining Muncie, Indiana). The classic study finding the absence of a local power elite is Robert Dahl,
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and Fraga, electoral politics in each of these four cities has been
dominated, or at least was controlled for a substantial period of
time, by a nonpartisan, white, upper class, business-oriented group.
This group systematically identified and ran for office candidates
who consider the promotion and protection of local business a paramount governmental concern and who view the role of the
elected official to be running the government as a business. The
slating groups have supported only a few token minority candidates, and no candidate, white or otherwise, is acceptable if he or
she has an axe to grind. Plainly and simply, each slating group is
described as a local power elite unconcerned with minority
interests.
Davidson and Fraga state that the candidates nominated by
these slating groups have been elected approximately ninety percent of the time in Abilene, Wichita Falls, and, for a time, Dallas.
The slating group was also highly successful in San Antonio until
it splintered over local development issues and was politically
weakened when single-member districting replaced at-large elections as the result of a deal struck with the Department of Justice
to obtain preclearance under the Voting Rights Act for certain annexations of white suburbs. Similarly, the Dallas slating group
lost its power in 1975 when a federal district court concluded that
Dallas' at-large electoral scheme unconstitutionally diluted the
vote of that city's minority community and imposed some singlemember districts to remedy the problem.
The courts have recognized that the openness of slating
groups to minority candidates is a factor worth examining in assessing a vote dilution claim,41 but that factor is rarely thought to
be crucial. The work of Davidson and Fraga indicates that this
consideration deserves more attention. In combination with an atlarge electoral scheme and a white bloc-voting majority, the presence of a powerful slating group closed to meaningful minority
candidates should be forceful evidence of vote dilution.
B.
The collection includes three legal essays that are especially
important. They are the work of Armand Derfner, Frank Parker,
Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (1961) (examining New
Haven, Connecticut).
41. The exclusivity of a slating group was one factor leading to the result in
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766-67, and it was one of the questions to be considered under the test of Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1305.
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and James Blacksher and Larry Menefee, among the finest voting
rights attorneys.
1.
The essay by Frank Parker focuses on the danger that legislative reapportionment, required by the "one person, one vote" concept, can be manipulated in a discriminatory fashion.42 Although
claims that district line-drawing is unconstitutionally discriminatory require proof that the cartography was discriminatorily motivated,43 redistricting as a result of the decennial census in
jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act constitutes a change
in voting structure that must be precleared under the Act as having neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect. 44
As Parker notes, in this age of computer cartography literally hundreds of alternative districting schemes can be created that comply
with the "one person, one vote" concept, and in his view "the challenge in the 1980s . . . is to develop objective and nondiscriminatory standards for selection of the 'best' plan among the wide
range of choices."45
How does one make the decision whether reapportionment
has a discriminatory effect upon minority voting rights? One obvious issue is whether the minority community is better off being
split into a substantial minority of voters in several districts, so
that it may be able to cast swing votes and spread its power, or
whether the minority community would be better protected if it is
concentrated into a smaller number of districts in which minority
voters predominate. Parker forcefully argues that, whenever demonstrable racial bloc-voting is present, minority voters are obviously disadvantaged whenever the districting plan splits their
community into several districts in which they do not constitute a
majority of voters. Moreover, since the minority community tends
to be younger than the general population, voting-age population
statistics must be considered in assessing the strength of the minority vote. The present effects of past racial discrimination also
hamper minority voting, and thus statistics concerning registered
voters and voter turnout must be considered as well. These factors
suggest to Parker, as they have to the Department of Justice and
the courts in exercising their preclearance responsibilities under
the Voting Rights Act, that a district must have at least sixty-five
42. Parker, supra note 18.
43. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
44. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
45. Parker, supra note 18, at 106.
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percent minority citizens to assure the minority community a fair
opportunity- perhaps a fifty-fifty chance-to elect a candidate of
its choice.46
Parker's analysis may be read as promoting proportional representation, a concept neither the Voting Rights Act nor the
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments support. Under the Voting Rights Act amendments

of 1982, however, when preclearing changes, the Department of
Justice and the courts seem to be required to assess not only
whether the proposed electoral scheme causes a retrogression in
minority voting power-the traditional issue under section 5, the
preclearance provision of the Act-but also whether the overall
electoral scheme of the jurisdiction violates amended section 2's
prohibition of systems that "result" in minority vote dilution.47 In
settings where severe racial bloc voting exists, the only effective
means to protect against violations of section 2 will be to create
one or more districts in which the minority community has a
supermajority of voters. In settings where racial separateness is
not so drastically politicized, such districting is not necessary. In
short, rather than requiring universal proportional representation,
an approach similar to the "sixty-five percent rule" is simply a
technique of thwarting vote dilution that would violate amended
section 2.48
46. Id. at 111. See Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering
and the Voting Rights Act, 94 Yale L.J. 189, 201 (1984).
47. The Senate committee report supporting the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act states:
Under the rule of Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), a voting
change which is ameliorative is not objectionable unless the change
"itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution." 425 U.S. at 141 ....
In light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 2.
In analyzing submissions, the Attorney General has correctly
taken the position that the immediately preceding plan is not
necesarily [sic] the standard against which to measure retrogression if
that plan was precleared without the appropriate section 5 review.... The same should also hold true if the prior plan was
precleared under standards that no longer apply.... This rule is in
keeping with the Attorney General's statement that redistricting submissions under section 5 are to be treated on a case-by-case basis, "in
light of all the facts." Letter from AAG Reynolds to Chairman Hatch,
February 25, 1982.
S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 12 n.31. See Note, GettingResults UnderSection 5
of the Voting Rights Act, 94 Yale L.J. 139, 149-62 (1984).
48. The distinction between impermissible proportional representation and remediable vote dilution in the context of redistricting is a fundamental issue in a
case now pending before the Supreme Court. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345
(E.D.N.C. 1984) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 105 S.Ct. 2137 (1985).
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Another possible criticism of Parker's essay is that his proposal for "supermajority minority districts" might appear to propose
extraordinary protections for citizens who have the opportunity to
protect themselves. After all, this argument would go, under the
Voting Rights Act minority citizens have the opportunity to register and to vote without hindrance, and if their political power is
diluted because proportionally more of them do not choose to register and to vote they have only themselves to blame. Parker recognized this argument and responded as follows:
Mhese disparities [in registration and turnout] are directly attributable to the extensive history of past discrimination, including purposeful denial to blacks of the opportunity to
register and vote, and depressed socioeconomic conditions in
the black community which limit electoral participation and
are also the direct result of past discrimination. In addition,
low turnout may result from alienation of eligible black voters
caused by past exclusion and racial gerrymandering, giving rise
to the perception that these official, continuing barriers and
bloc voting have made black political particicontinued racial
49
pation futile.
In other words, the disproportionally lower registration and voting
of minority citizens are so intimately linked to past, official, intentional discrimination that they provide further proof of the need
for systematic relief for minority vote dilution. Holding disproportionally lower minority registration and voting against the minority, Parker's analysis suggests, would be another instance of what
William Ryan described as "blaming the victim."50
2.
The second important legal essay is Armand Derfner's description of the legislative history of the crucial 1982 amendment
to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.5 ' Derfner is well qualified to
tell the civil rights community's side of this story, as he (as well as
49. Parker, supra note 18, at 110.
50. William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (1971). In brief, Ryan argued persuasively that the disadvantaged in American society do not suffer that fate because
they are "inferior" in any sense or because they have been socialized into a "culture
of poverty." Rather, he contended,
The overwhelming majority of the poor are poor because they have,
first: insufficient income; and second: no access to methods of increasing that income-that is, no power. They are too young, too old, too
sick; they are bound to the task of caring for small children, or they
are simply discriminated against. The facts are clear, and the solution
seems rather obvious- raise their income and let their 'culture,'
whatever it might be, take care of itself.
Id. at 134-35.
51. Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, in Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 2, at 145-63.
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Parker and several others) was a central figure in the lobbying
that led to this legislation. Yet, despite the less than objective
stance I assumed he would bring to his essay, I have difficulty criticizing it. Because I believe that the amendment to section 2 is
necessary to remedy Mobile, my evaluation of Derfner's essay may
reflect my own prejudices. After extended reflection, however, I
honestly believe that Derfner accurately presents the legislative
history, and that (in addition to his honorable character) there is
an obvious explanation for his lack of bias. The simple fact is that
the civil rights community achieved essentially all of their goals in
the 1982 amendments to the Act. 52 In this light, it seems obvious

to me why Derfner is such an accurate reporter of the legislative
history: he had a major hand in creating it and, since it embodies
the goals of the civil rights community, he has no reason to distort
or exaggerate it.
Two major issues regarding amended section 2 are now probably on their way to the Supreme Court. The first concerns the
proper interpretation of the statute's ban on electoral schemes that
disproportionally disadvantage minority voting. The second is
whether the statute itself is constitutional. Both are among the
most crucial civil rights questions now pending in the courts.
Derfner provides the unassailable answer to the first issue.
The report of the Senate committee responsible for the version of
amended section 2 enacted into law demonstrates beyond doubt
that the statute was intended to overrule the approach of Mobile
and to impose a discriminatory-effect standard similar in many,
but not all, ways to the approach of White v. Regester and Zimmer
v. McKeithen. The Senate committee report lists extensive criteria a court should consider in assessing whether the electoral
scheme under review violates section 2. There is no honest argument that these factors have any purpose other than identifying
discriminatory effect sufficiently substantial to constitute a statu52. The Senate's amendment to the proposal to amend section 2, which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 56-60, has been viewed by some as a "compromise" that was necessary to assure passage of any amendment legislatively
overturning Mobile. See Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks,
105 S. Ct. 416, 418 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); James Blumstein, Defining
and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. 633, 694-701 (1983). However,
that amendment maintained the discriminatory effects approach sought by the civil
rights community and simply disclaimed any requirement of proportional representation, which civil rights lobbyists had not sought. Thus, the Senate amendment
was not a substantive compromise on the part of the civil rights community. But cf.
infra note 105.
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tory violation.53 Arguments to the contrary can only be seen as at-

tempts to provide the Supreme Court with a hook upon which to
hang an interpretation eviscerating the amendment.
Derfner describes the basis for one of these arguments. Opponents to the amendment to section 2 either minimized or exaggerated its meaning: it was painted as either nothing more than a ban
on electoral systems adopted or maintained for discriminatory purposes or as a requirement of outright proportional representation.M This all-or-nothing outlook should have no impact upon the
judicial construction of the amendment, since it came from opponents to the legislation whose comments cannot be deemed trust53. See S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 28-29 (footnotes, which explicate several of these factors, are omitted):
If as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not
have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and
to elect candidates of their choice, there is a violation of [section 2]. To
establish a violation, plaintiffs could show a variety of factors, depending upon the kind of rule, practice, or procedure called into question.
Typical factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members
of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate
in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements,
anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures
that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members
of the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in
such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by
overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as
part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part
of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's
use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice or procedure is tenuous.
While these enumerated factors will often be the most relevant
ones, in some cases other factors will be indicative of the alleged dilution.
The cases demonstrate, and the Committee intends that there is
no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or
that a majority of them point one way or the other.
54. See Derfner, supra note 51, at 159-60.
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worthy interpretations. 55
The second argument seeking to gut amended section 2 relates to the first. As enacted, section 2 includes language taken directly from White v. Regester that the Senate inserted to allay
56
fears that the statute would require proportional representation.
Opponents of a proper interpretation of new section 2 might contend that White dealt with discriminatory intent, not discriminatory effect, that this reading is unassailable since the Supreme
Court in Mobile interpreted White in this fashion, and therefore
that an electoral system must be shown to be infected by discriminatory intent before it can violate section 2.57 However, Congress'
intent, and not the Supreme Court's interpretation of White, controls the construction of amended section 2. The legislative history
makes clear that Congress interpreted White as a case concerned
with discriminatory impact, not discriminatory intent, and that
Congress disagreed with the Court's differing interpretation of
White in Mobile .58 Of course, Congress recognized that, short of
constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court has the last word
concerning its own precedent and the interpretation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 59 What the Court has done,
however, in no way inhibits Congress from disagreeing with the
policy outcomes of the Court's decisions and reversing those outcomes in new legislation, so long as that legislation is constitutional. Indeed, Senator Dole, a chief architect of the amendment
adding the language from White to section 2, expressed his clear
understanding that his amendment maintained the discriminatory
impact approach of section 2 while clarifying that it did not man55. Although the Supreme Court often appears willing to consider any aspect of
the legislative history of a statute, see, e.g., Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195
(1983), the opinions of opponents to the statute are usually accorded little weight.
As the Court has recognized, opponents, "in their zeal to defeat a bill ... tend to
overstate its reach," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976), or
otherwise mangle its true purposes.
56. Compare the language of amended section 2(b), which is quoted in the text
accompanying note 30, with White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766: "The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in
question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice."
(citation omitted). See S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 27.
57. See United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1564 n.29
(11th Cr.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 375 (1984); Derfner, supra
note 51, at 156.
58. Marengo County, 731 F.2d at 1564 n.29, cites the relevant legislative history.
59. See S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 41.
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date proportional representation.6 0 In light of the above, the argument that Congress incorporated the Mobile interpretation of
White into amended section 2 is absurd-it would not have
changed the law at all.
The major lower court interpretation of amended section 2
thus far has properly held that "discriminatory intent need not be
shown to establish a violation [of section 2]."61 Moreover, recently
the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a district court decision
agreeing with this conclusion. 62 The most this summary affirmance accomplished, however, was to settle that amended section 2
prohibits some discriminatory effects. Exactly what effects the
statute prohibits remain unsettled, and indeed that question provoked two separate opinions by Justices.63
Amended section 2 has a good deal of play in its joints. The
factors identified in the legislative history as relevant indicia of
prohibited vote dilution 64 are vague and invest enormous discretion in the federal district judge who makes findings of fact in a
vote dilution case. Unless district judges inform their factfinding
with the spirit of the legislative history of section 2, it is likely that
some judges will narrowly apply the vague criteria and improperly
deny relief. Unless appellate judges are prepared to examine district judges' findings of facts closely, some future cases may only
be explained by which district judges were assigned the cases, not
by the merits of the various plaintiffs' claims.
This unfortunate possibility, however, should not leave us
forlorn. Designing a workable standard based on discriminatory
effects has always been a problem.6 5 That difficulty alone must
not deter attempts to solve the problem. Moreover, the possibility
that some deserving plaintiffs may not receive relief because the
discriminatory effects standard is vague and manipulable should
not detract from the fact that many more deserving plaintiffs now
have a realistic chance of prevailing. Neither should we underesti60. See id.at 193-95 (additional views of Senator Dole); 128 Cong. Rec. S7119
(daily ed. June 17, 1982) (statement of Senator Dole).
61. Marengo County, 731 F.2d at 1564 (Wisdom, J.). To the same effect is Jones
v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 380 (5th Cir. 1984).
62. Jordan v. Winter, No. GC82-80-WK-0 (N.D. Miss., Apr. 16, 1984), summarily
affd sub nom. Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 105 S. Ct.
416 (1984).
63. Id.at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring); id.at 418 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting).
64. See supra note 53.

65. One classic example is Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1972) (en banc), disapproved in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 & n.12
(1976). See generally Michael Perry, The DisproportionateRacial Impact Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540 (1977).
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mate the deterrent value of amended section 2. Section 2 provides
minority leaders with a valuable bargaining chip with local government officials, and the threat of vote-dilution lawsuits may well
deter a variety of improper governmental activities and may lead
to negotiated settlements to local political problems, whether they
are structural or substantive.
The second major issue concerning amended section 2 is
whether it will survive constitutional attack. A recent summary
affirmance by the Supreme Court may bar future arguments that
this statute's prohibition on discriminatory effects renders it
facially unconstitutional. 66 But it is unresolved precisely what discriminatory effects fall within the statute, and it is possible the
Court will find the statute unconstitutional as applied in some
circumstances.
The extent of Congress' authority to enforce the protections
of the fourteenth and the fifteenth amendments "by appropriate
legislation" 67 has never been definitively resolved, 68 and Derfner's
essay does not address this issue. 69 Although an extensive analysis
of this question is beyond the scope of this essay, some arguments
in support of the statute seem apparent.
In light of Katzenbach v. Morgan ,70 it can be argued that
66. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his opinion concurring in the summary
affirmance in Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, a summary
affirmance rejects the specific challenges raised in the jurisdictional statement in
the case at bar. The jurisdictional statement in the Brooks case raised the issues
"[w]hether Section 2 as amended prohibits only those electoral schemes intentionally designed or maintained to discriminate on the basis of race," and "[w]hether
Section 2, if construed to prohibit anything other than intentional discrimination on
the basis of race in registration and voting, exceeds the power vested in Congress
by the Fifteenth Amendment." 105 S. Ct. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation
and footnote omitted).
67. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[t]he Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," and
section 2 of the fifteenth amendment states that "[t]he Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
68. See, e.g., Sidney Buchanan, Katzenbach v. Morgan and Congressional Enforcement Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment" A Study in Conceptual Confusion, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 69 (1979); Robert Burt, Miranda and Title IL A
MorganaticMarriage, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81; Jesse Choper, CongressionalPower to
Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 299 (1982); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Processand Equal Protection, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 603 (1975); Note, Toward
Limits on CongressionalEnforcement Power Under the Civil War Amendments,
34 Stan. IL Rev. 453 (1982).
69. Both congressional committee reports did address this issue, however, and
concluded that amended section 2 fell within Congress' authority to enforce the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. See S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 39-43;
H.R. Rep. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-31 (1981).
70. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Congress has the constitutional authority to expand, but not to
contract, the protections of the Civil War amendments beyond
what the Supreme Court has construed them to mean. This "one
way rachet" theory would easily justify the amendment to section
2 as based on Congress' disagreement with the Court about the appropriate construction of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. This rationale is intensely controversial, however, and has
not been directly relied upon by the Court since the Morgan
decision.
A less controversial argument is based on the Court's apparent rationale in the Rome decision,71 which upheld the constitutionality of the 1975 extension of the Voting Rights Act. Rome
found constitutional the preclearance mechanism of section 5,
which allows covered jurisdictions to change electoral laws only so
long as the new electoral structure is not tainted by discriminatory
intent and does not have a discriminatory effect upon minority
voting strength. Rome did not hold that Congress may always outlaw discriminatory effects, but it did clearly suggest that Congress
may prohibit discriminatory effects whenever it reasonably concludes that such action is necessary to reduce the risk of constitutional violations--that is, intentional discrimination. 72 The Court
used this rationale to uphold applying section 5's prohibition on
changes with discriminatory effects to Rome, Georgia, even though
the city had proved to the district court that the electoral changes
at issue were not tainted by discriminatory intent.7 3 Thus, Congress may constitutionally adopt an across-the-board prohibition
on electoral schemes with discriminatory effects so long as Congress has reasonably concluded that these effects may be linked to
discriminatory intent, even if the prohibition is overinclusive. As
Justice Stewart once recognized in discussing Congress' authority
to enforce the Civil War amendments, "Congress may paint with a
much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and contro71. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).

72. The Court in Rome stated:
mhe Act's ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is
an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth
Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination in voting. Congress could rationally
have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a
demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit
changes that have a discriminatory impact.
I&

at 177 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 209 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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''74

versies upon individual records.
Regardless of the reasons local officials adopt an electoral
system that has a disproportionate impact upon minority voting
strength, it is certainly unconstitutional under Mobile and Rogers
for local officials to maintain that scheme for discriminatory reasons. 75 In light of Rome, Congress would appear to have the authority to outlaw all electoral schemes that disproportionally
disadvantage the minority; the maintenance of such schemes
clearly risks constitutional violations, and the difficulty of proving
intentional discrimination is enormous. In enacting amended section 2, Congress adopted a more limited remedy, outlawing only
those schemes that meet the criteria specified in the legislative history, which are designed to identify systems having a plain and
substantial discriminatory impact upon current minority votersprecisely the systems that government officials harboring discriminatory motivations would wish to perpetuate.
Rome supports another argument sustaining amended section
2. Under Mobile, an electoral system that disproportionally disadvantages the minority community is unconstitutional if it was
adopted for discriminatory purposes, even if current officials have
76
maintained the system for entirely neutral, nonracial reasons.
There is substantial historical evidence that many at-large electoral schemes were adopted at least in part to ensure that minority
77
Invoters would not have meaningful power in electoral politics.

74. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 284 (1970) (Stewart, J., joined by Burger,
C.J. and Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. The plurality opinion in Mobile stated that "[a] plaintiff must prove that the
disputed [electoral] plan was 'conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.'" 446 U.S. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124, 149 (1971)). In addition, see Mobile, 446 U.S. at 70, 74 n.21. In Rogers v.
Lodge, the majority opinion of the Court affirmed a lower court finding that the atlarge system in question was unconstitutional because it "was being maintained for
the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population." 458
U.S. at 622.
76. See the quotation from Mobile, supra note 75. In addition, see Hunter v.
Underwood, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 1923 (1985).
77. The widespread adoption of at-large electoral schemes and other "reform"
structures occurred during the Progressive Era in American history, which ran
roughly from 1893-1917. A substantial historical literature indicates that, although
the Progressives thought of themselves as reformers, in fact the structural changes
they embraced were designed to enhance white business interests and to diminish
the political influence "of the working classes and ethnic and political minorities,
and they usually had that effect." Davidson, supra note 35, at 11. See Bradley Rice,
Progressive Cities (1977); Davidson & Korbel, supra note 38, at 67-71; Samuel
Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the ProgressiveEra, 55
Pac. Nw. Q. 160 (1964); James Weinstein, Organized Business and the City Commission and Manager Movements, 28 J. So. Hist. 168 (1962). An essay in Minority
Vote Dilution presents evidence that the adoption of at-large electoral systems in
southern jurisdictions was in part racially motivated even though laws disen-
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deed, the district court on remand in Mobile found that the atlarge electoral systems for both the city commission and for the
school commission had been installed for discriminatory purposes.
The finding in the school case-the only case appealed-was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court.78 When
decades have passed since the time of adoption, however, it is usually impossible to prove that any particular electoral structure was
adopted for discriminatory reasons.7 9 Moreover, such an undertaking requires an enormous investment of attorney time and expert
witness consultation that few minority plaintiffs could afford.80
franchising Blacks were already on the books. The author, historian J. Morgan
Kousser, points out that some Blacks did vote despite the presence of those laws
and asserts that the move to at-large elections was one way in which whites attempted to guarantee that Blacks remained politically powerless. See J. Morgan
Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in
Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 2, at 27-46.
78. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (city commission); Brown v. Board of School Comm'rs, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982)
(school commission), affd, 706 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1983), affd mem., 104 S.Ct. 520
(1983).
79. The difficulty of proving intentional discrimination many years after the
fact was one factor that convinced Congress to amend section 2 to prohibit discriminatory "results." See S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 36-37; H.R. Rep. No. 227,
supra note 69, at 29, 31. In addition, Congress found a more fundamental problem
with a standard under which discriminatory intent must be shown:
[That] test asks the wrong question. In the Bolden case on remand,
the district court after a tremendous expenditure of resources by the
parties and the court, concluded that officials had acted more than 100
years ago for discriminatory motives. However, if an electoral system
operates today to exclude blacks or Hispanics from a fair chance to
participate, then the matter of what motives were in an official's mind
100 years ago is of the most limited relevance. The standard under the
Committee amendment is whether minorities have equal access to the
process of electing their representatives. If they are denied a fair opportunity to participate, the Committee believes that the system
should be changed, regardless of what may or may not be provable
about events which took place decades ago.
S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 36. The committee report continued by noting
another difficulty with a discriminatory intent standard:
[T]he Committee has heard persuasive testimony that the intent test is
unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part
of individual officials or entire communities. As Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, testified...:
[L]itigators representing excluded minorities will have to explore the motivations of individual council members, mayors, and
other citizens. The question would be whether their decisions were
motivated by invidious racial considerations. Such inquiries can only
be divisive, threatening to destroy any existing racial progress in a
community. It is the intent test, not the results test, that would
make it necessary to brand individuals as racist in order to obtain
judicial relief.
S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 36 (footnote omitted). In addition, see id. at 193
(additional views of Senator Dole).
80. Davidson reports that the trial on remand in the Mobile cases "took 6,000
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Yet because there is a substantial risk that any such system was
adopted at least in part for discriminatory reasons, and because the
difficulties of proving the taint of discriminatory motivation are so
enormous as to deter almost all plaintiffs, Congress would seem to
be empowered under Rome simply to outlaw all at-large
schemes-and any other electoral devices that historical evidence
suggests are likely to be tainted by discriminatory intent-that
currently have a discriminatory effect upon the minority. In
adopting amended section 2, as noted above, Congress did something much more limited and much less controversial. 8 '
3.
The third important legal essay, written by James Blacksher
and Larry Menefee, traces the tortuous history of litigation addressing the constitutional protection against vote dilution and attempts to create a standard for judging unconstitutional vote
dilution that is superior to any articulated in the cases.8 2 Blacksher and Menefee, who litigated the Mobile case, assert that all the
standards proposed in Mobile -including that suggested by Justice
Marshall, which was the most favorable from the perspective of
minority plaintiffs---are infirm. In a way, I wonder whether this
83
essay, as well as the law review article upon which it is based,
might be the brief that Blacksher and Menefee wish in retrospect
they had filed in Mobile. In any event, the essay is thoughtful,
provocative, and, as the rejection of Justice Marshall's approach
suggests, much more than a mere result-oriented effort.
Not surprisingly, Blacksher and Menefee reject the approach
of the plurality in Mobile and the majority in Rogers v. Lodge,
which requires a showing of discriminatory intent to invalidate an
electoral system that disproportionally disadvantages minority voters. Blacksher and Menefee stress that this approach not only derogates minority voting concerns, it constitutionally prefers the
"'one person, one vote concept"-a violation of which does not rehours of lawyers' time, along with 7,000 for researchers and expert witnesses; cost

$120,000 not counting lawyers' fees; and lasted two and a half weeks, during which
the most minute change in city government from 1819 to the present was explored." Davidson, supra note 35, at 17.
81. For lower-court decisions upholding the constitutionality of amended section 2, see cases cited supra note 61.
82. James Blacksher & Larry Menefee, At-Large Elections and One Person, One
Vote: The Searchfor the Meaning of Racial Vote Dilution, in Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 2, at 203-48.

83. James Blacksher & Larry Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden" Have the White Suburbs Comandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?,
34 Hastings L.J. 1 (1982).
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quire a showing of discriminatory animus--over the concern of the
minority for a fair chance to participate politically. These reasons
why a discriminatory effects standard rather than a discriminatory
intent standard is appropriate have been noted elsewhere, 84 however, and while Blacksher and Menefee provide perhaps the best
analysis to date, their arguments are not novel.
Blacksher and Menefee make two major contributions. First,
they take on the views of Justice Stevens in Mobile 85 and in Rogers 86 and attempt to demonstrate that his analysis is not convincing. Second, they do their best to propose a workable
constitutional vote-dilution standard free from the weaknesses of
others that have been proposed.
In his opinions in Mobile and Rogers, Justice Stevens has argued that vote dilution arising from an at-large electoral scheme is
essentially the same problem as that in any gerrymandering case
and is a much different problem from that in "one person, one
vote" cases. In at-large electoral cases and gerrymandering cases,
Stevens believed that what was at issue was whether a politically
cohesive group, whether racial or nonracial, had suffered vote dilution. In contrast, in the "one person, one vote" context, he believed each individual had a right to complain about the dilution
of her vote caused by unequal population among districts. Stevens
saw such individual rights at the core of the equal protection
clause, while the group rights he found in the gerrymandering and
dilution cases lay at the periphery.
Stevens' approach would radically expand and contract voting
rights at the same time. His willingness to provide a measure of
protection to all cohesive political groups, including those of a nonracial nature, has not been shared by other Justices.8 7 On the
other hand, his refusal to provide racial groups with protection
greater than that he would accord nonracial groups is also inconsistent with the views of his judicial colleagues. To Stevens, the
use of "group" criteria-whether racial, ethnic, geographic, or
84. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 103-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting); S. Rep. No. 417, supra note 11, at 27-37; H.R. Rep. No. 227, supra note 69, at
28-32; Note, supra note 23, at 720-32.
85. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 83-94 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).

86. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 631-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. See Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2667-2668 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). In addition, see Karcher v. Daggett, 104 S. Ct. 1691, 1692 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring in denial of application for stay); id. at 1692-97 (Brennan, J., joined
by White, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay). The
Court recently noted probable jurisdiction of an appeal raising the issue whether
political gerrymandering presents a claim cognizable under the equal protection
clause. See Davis v. Bandemer, No. 84-1244, prob. juris noted, 105 S.Ct. 1840 (1985).
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whatever else makes the group a group-is inherent in the drawing of districting lines, and race is no more pernicious a criterion
88
than any other.
At bottom, Stevens saw it predictable that those in political
power would attempt to gerrymander to keep themselves "in" and
the "outs" out. He perceived no manageable way for a court to
regulate in such a political thicket unless the districting in question was obviously arbitrary on its face or could be explained only
by a desire to disadvantage a politically cohesive group. His standard seems essentially equivalent to the garden-variety rational
basis test so common in constitutional adjudication. Stevens' approach, so harshly expressed in his separate opinion in Mobile,89
88. In his separate opinion in Mobile, Stevens stated:
By definition, gerrymandering involves drawing district boundaries (or
using multimember districts or at-large elections) in order to maximize the voting strength of those loyal to the dominant political faction and to minimize the strength of those opposed to it. In seeking
the desired result, legislators necessarily make judgments about the
probability that the members of certain identifiable groups, whether
racial, ethnic, economic, or religious, will vote in the same way. The
success of the gerrymander from the legislators' point of view, as well
as its impact on the disadvantaged group, depends on the accuracy of
those predictions.
A prediction based on a racial characteristic is not necessarily
more reliable than a prediction based on some other group characteristic. Nor, since a legislator's ultimate purpose in making the prediction
is political in character, is it necessarily more invidious or benign than
a prediction based on other group characteristics. In the line-drawing
process, racial, religious, ethnic, and economic gerrymanders are all
species of political gerrymanders.
From the standpoint of the groups of voters that are affected by
the line-drawing process, it is also important to recognize that it is the
group's interest in gaining or maintaining political power that is at
stake. The mere fact that a number of citizens share a common ethnic, racial, or religious background does not create the need for protection against gerrymandering. It is only when their common interests
are strong enough to be manifested in political action that the need
arises. For the political strength of a group is not a function of its ethnic, racial, or religious composition; rather, it is a function of numbers- specifically the numbers of persons who will vote in the same
way. In the long run there is no more certainty that individual members of racial groups will vote alike than that members of other identifiable groups will do so. And surely there is no national interest in
creating an incentive to define political groups by racial characteristics.
But if the Constitution were interpreted to give more favorable treatment to a racial minority alleging an unconstitutional impairment of
its political strength than it gives to other identifiable groups making
the same claim, such an incentive would inevitably result.
446 U.S. at 87-89 (citations and footnotes omitted).
89. Stevens stated:
In my view, the proper standard is suggested by three characteristics
of the gerrymander condemned in Gomilion [v. Ligh(foot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960)]: (1) the 28-sided configuration was, in the Court's word,
'uncouth,' that is to say, it was manifestly not the product of a routine
or a traditional political decision; (2) it had a significant adverse impact
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may have softened somewhat in his dissenting opinion in Rogers,
where he suggested that districting was arbitrary and capricious if
done only to keep the "ins" in and that upon the showing of a
prima facie case, the burden might shift to defendants "to identify
legitimate local policies that might justify the use" of the electoral
devices in question. 90
The Stevens analysis is provocative. My most basic criticism
of this approach is that, by not providing racial minority groups superior protection to that given other cohesive political groups, it
embodies a policy forbidden by the fifteenth amendment and in no
way suggested by the fourteenth amendment. The language of the
fifteenth amendment expressly provides that the right to vote
"shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." The fourteenth amendment has
on a minority group; and (3) it was unsupported by any neutral justification and thus was either totally irrational or entirely motivated by a
desire to curtail the political strength of the minority.... In this case,
if the commission form of government in Mobile were extraordinary,
or if it were nothing more than a vestige of history, with no greater
justification than the grotesque figure in Gomillion, it would surely violate the Constitution. That conclusion would follow simply from its
adverse impact on black voters plus the absence of any legitimate justification for the system, without reference to the subjective intent of
the political body that has refused to alter it.
Conversely, I am also persuaded that a political decision that affects group voting rights may be valid even if it can be proved that irrational or invidious factors have played some part in its enactment or
retention. The standard for testing the acceptability of such a decision
must take into account the fact that the responsibility for drawing
political boundaries is generally committed to the legislative process
and that the process inevitably involves a series of compromises among
different group interests. If the process is to work, it must reflect an
awareness of group interests and it must tolerate some attempts to advantage or to disadvantage particular segments of the voting popuThe standard cannot, therefore, be so strict that any
lace....
evidence of a purpose to disadvantage a bloc of voters will justify a
finding of "invidious discrimination"; otherwise, the facts of political
life would deny legislatures the right to perform the districting function. Accordingly, a political decision that is supported by valid and articulable justifications cannot be invalid simply because some
participants in the decisionmaking process were motivated by a purpose to disadvantage a minority group.
The decision to retain the commission form of government in Mobile, Ala., is such a decision. I am persuaded that some support for its
retention comes, directly or indirectly, from members of the white majority who are motivated by a desire to make it more difficult for
members of the black minority to serve in positions of responsibility in
city government. I deplore that motivation and wish that neither it
nor any other irrational prejudice played any part in our political
processes. But I do not believe otherwise legitimate political choices
can be invalidated simply because an irrational or invidious purpose
played some part in the decisionmaking process.
Id. at 90-92 (footnotes omitted).

90. 458 U.S. at 640-41.
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no such language directly governing the right to vote, and while I
agree with interpretations of it that forbid certain forms of voting
discrimination,9 1 the general terms of the equal protection clause
should not override or reduce the force of the more specific protections of the fifteenth amendment. The core historical purpose of
both amendments was, after all, to provide enhanced protections
to racial minorities. Moreover, Stevens' race-neutral approach is
grounded in a distorted view of the political power of minority
groups in American society in general and on the local level in
particular.92 In short, Stevens seems blind both to the constitutional basis for enhanced protection of minority political power
and to the present social need for that protection. Blacksher and
Menefee do not make this critique in precisely these terms, but
they recognize its force.
In addition, Blacksher and Menefee make a second telling argument: under Stevens' approach, no at-large electoral system will
ever be invalidated, since there is always a facially neutral justification-e.g., the desire to encourage officeholders to take a citywide view of problems, to avoid ward-heeling, and so on-available
to sustain it. Unlike in the ordinary gerrymandering case, at-large
schemes by nature involve population equality, a compact district,
and no bizarre districting lines that might suggest arbitrary or discriminatory political cartography. Thus, at-large systems are simply immune under a standard based on facial arbitrariness.
91. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 589-632 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(framers of fourteenth amendment did not intend equal protection clause to regulate voting) with William Van Alstyne, The FourteenthAmendmen4 The "Right" to
Vote, and the Understandingof the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 33.
92. In his dissenting opinion in Rogers, Stevens stated:
A constitutional standard that gave special protection to political
groups identified by racial characteristics would be inconsistent with
the basic tenet of the Equal Protection Clause. Those groups are no
more or no less able to pursue their interests in the political arena
than are groups defined by other characteristics. Nor can it be said
that racial alliances are so unrelated to political action that any electoral decision that is influenced by racial consciousness-as opposed to
other forms of political consciousness--is inherently irrational. For it
is the very political power of a racial or ethnic group that creates a
danger that an entrenched majority will take action contrary to the
group's political interests. "The mere fact that a number of citizens
share a common ethnic, racial, or religious background does not create
the need for protection against gerrymandering. It is only when their
common interests are strong enough to be manifested in political action that the need arises. Thus the characteristic of the group which
creates the need for protection is its political character." Cousins v.
City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 852 (CA7 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It would be unrealistic to distinguish racial groups from
other political groups on the ground that race is an irrelevant factor in
the political process.
458 U.S. at 651.
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Carrying this theme to its logical conclusion, Blacksher and
Menefee state:
[Stevens] failed to observe that at-large districting is not just
another potential gerrymander. Rather, it is a decision not to
district at all. It is a legislative decision not to engage at all in
the political process of apportioning seats to geographic areas,
but instead to allow the same citywide or countywide majority
to control all of the seats. Since no political apportionment
choices are made, there is no chance for them to be made invidiously or irrationally. Meanwhile, under [his] rational basis
standard, the at-large scheme enjoys its guaranteed, boilerplate acceptability. The rational basis standard may or may
not be a workable, constitutionally acceptable approach to
claims that equally populated districts have been drawn to
But it will
carve up the voting strength of a protected group.
93
always flop as a measure of at-large dilution.
That result might satisfy Stevens if he intended to prohibit any relief in all vote-dilution cases involving at-large systems. That was
not his stated motivation, however, and would seem inconsistent
with his somewhat sympathetic analysis of the facts in Rogers .94
In any event, if he wanted to reach that result it would be much
easier to get there by alternative theories. It seems that, at least in
the context of minority vote dilution claims challenging at-large
systems, Stevens has been, as the British say, "too clever by half."
Moreover, Stevens' approach is suspect even if the policies of
the fifteenth amendment are ignored in considering the fourteenth
amendment. Blacksher and Menefee criticize Stevens for inconsistently adhering to the strict scrutiny applied in the "one person,
one vote" context while adopting a much more deferential standard in vote dilution cases. If the goal of the equal protection
clause is to give each citizen an "equally effective voice," as ReynOads v. Sims indicated,95 that goal ought to apply equally in the dilution context as in the "one person, one vote" context. As
Blacksher and Menefee note: "Equally populated districts ...
simply create groups on the basis of geography. To determine
whether individual voters have equally effective voices, reference
must be made to the voting propensities of other voters both
93. Blacksher & Menefee, supr'a note 82, at 230.
94. In Rogers, 458 U.S. at 638-39, Stevens noted that there were three features

of the electoral system in question that "make it especially difficult for a minority
candidate to win an election": a requirement that each commissioner run for a separately designated position; a majority-vote requirement; and the absence of any
residency requirement, which would allow all candidates to come from a single
white neighborhood.

Stevens opined that "[u]nless these features are indepen-

dently justified, they may be invalid simply because there is no legitimate justification for their impact on minority participation in elections." I& at 640.
95. 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
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within and without a particular person's district as well as to the
relative size of the district." 96 The essential point is that Reynolds
embraced the concept of equal voting power, and the equal-population requirement adopted in that case is simply one conception of
97
that principle.
It is possible, of course, that the Court in Reynolds only intended to correct vote dilution caused by population inequality
among districts, because that problem could be identified and remedied by simple mathematics. The rhetoric of Reynolds, however,
suggests far more than that. The Court's refusal to address the
difficult issues that stand in the way of turning rhetoric into reality is troubling because it comes at the expense of those who can
least protect themselves in the political process.
Converting the Reynolds rhetoric into meaningful protection
of minority voting rights requires creating a workable standard by
which to measure unconstitutional minority vote dilution. In his
dissenting opinion in Mobile, Justice Marshall tried to articulate
such a standard that would identify what types and magnitudes of
discriminatory effects should add up to unconstitutional minority
vote dilution. 98 Marshall's theory largely reflects the earlier standards suggested in White v. Regester and refined by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen. It tries to discern whether under
the totality of the circumstances the minority community has sufficient "access to the political process"-not simply in the narrow
96. Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 82, at 229.
97. Justice Marshall made essentially the same point in his dissenting opinion
in Mobile, 446 U.S. at 116 n.14. The distinction between concepts and conceptions
is, of course, borrowed from the work of Ronald Dworkin. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 134-37 (1977).
98. Justice Marshall stated:
When all that is proved is mere lack of success at the polls, the Court
will not presume that members of a political minority have suffered
an impermissible dilution of political power. Rather, it is assumed that
these persons have means available to them through which they can
have some effect on governmental decisionmaking. For example,
many of these persons might belong to a variety of other political, social, and economic groups that have some impact on officials. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be assumed that officials
will not be improperly influenced by such factors as the race or place
of residence of persons seeking governmental action. Furthermore,
political factions out of office often serve as watchdogs on the performance of the government, bind together into coalitions having enhanced
influence, and have the respectability necessary to affect public policy.
Unconstitutional vote dilution occurs only when a discrete political minority whose voting strength is diminished by a districting
scheme proves that historical and social factors render it largely incapable of effectively utilizing alternative avenues of influencing public
policy.
Mobile, 446 U.S. at 111 n.7.
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sense of being able to register and to vote without hindrance, but
also in the broader sense of being able to wheel and deal in the
political forum. His test also resembles the discriminatory "results" approach Congress adopted when it amended section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act in 1982. Blacksher and Menefee are obviously sympathetic to the Marshall view, but seem to agree with
Justice Stewart's critique, found in his plurality opinion in Mobile,
that Marshall's test would require courts to examine "gauzy sociological considerations" 99 without any judicially manageable
standards.10 0
Blacksher and Menefee propose an alternative standard for
measuring whether an electoral system sufficiently disadvantages
minority voting strength as to violate the Constitution:
An at-large election scheme for a state or local multirepresentative body is unconstitutional where jurisdictionwide elections permit a bloc voting majority, over a
substantial period of time, consistently to defeat candidates
publicly identified with the interests of and supported by a pogeographically insular racial or ethnic minorlitically cohesive,
ity group.1 01
Blacksher and Menefee indicate that the "racial or ethnic
group[s]" that would benefit under this approach include only
groups made up of persons entitled to claim the protection of the
fifteenth amendment. 10 2 Thus, their test properly recognizes that
groups that come within the fifteenth amendment should be ac99. Id. at 75 n.22.
100. Blacksher and Menefee state:
The 'access to the political process' standard espoused by... Marshall
... probably deserves the 'amorphous' label some members of the
Court bestowed on it. Most of the cases which concluded under the
Zimmer v.McKeithen guidelines that at-large schemes were constitutional could not honestly be distinguished analytically from those
which reached a contrary result-on any basis other than the varying
personal views of the trial and appellate judges who decide them. Capriciousness is an inherent risk of the 'intensely local appraisal' of
each 'totality of circumstances.'
To the extent that Justice Marshall embellishes the White v.
Regester-Zimmer v. McKeithen standard by calling for proof of 'historical and social factors' which make it difficult for the 'political minority' to influence public policy by means outside the at-large election
process, he might introduce more uncertainty and hence even less judicial manageability. The quality and quantity of proof sufficient to
demonstrate that blacks are unable to influence elected officials
through 'a variety of other political, social and economic groups' or are
unable to form effective out-of-office factions to 'serve as watchdogs on
the performance of the government' are sure to vary widely from case
to case and from court to court.
Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 82, at 226 (footnotes omitted).
101. Id. at 231.
102. Id, at 232-38.
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corded protection against vote dilution superior to any such protection afforded to all groups by the equal protection clause.
Blacksher and Menefee contend that their standard would
provide meaningful protection to the minority community and
would be far more manageable judicially than that proposed by
Marshall. The elements of a vote-dilution claim under their standard can be proved objectively, although of course there will be
close questions at the margin. The proposed test avoids the problem of a district judge being required to make a finding on the inherently vague and manipulable ultimate question at the heart of
the proposal suggested by Marshall and derived largely from
White and Zimmer: whether the minority community is sufficiently fenced out of the political process to merit relief. Under
the approach of Blacksher and Menefee, the judge does not address this ultimate question; rather, the judge makes findings on
anterior issues that can be proved objectively and those findings
demonstrate, as a matter of law, whether remediable vote dilution
is present.
For these reasons, the standard proposed by Blacksher and
Menefee is an attractive alternative to those previously addressed
in the cases and literature. It does, however, have at least one potentially troubling aspect. It could be viewed as imposing a guarantee of proportional representation, albeit a weak one, in that the
only proof minority plaintiffs must show is their historical inability to elect any candidates of their choice due to racial bloc voting.
In contrast, the approach developed by Justice Marshall in Mobile
and the standards set forth in White and in Zimmer use other factors that measure the political influence of the minority in broader
terms than electoral success alone. Blacksher and Menefee correctly criticize the vagueness and manipulability of those factors,
but the broader focus these factors provide is relevant when assessing whether fifteenth amendment values are at stake.
Whatever the merits of their proposal, the chance that it will
be adopted by the Supreme Court seems slight. There are at least
two major obstacles to its acceptance as a rule of constitutional
law.
First, in Rogers a majority of the Court purported to embrace
a discriminatory intent standard for evaluating unconstitutional
minority vote dilution. Yet Rogers upheld a lower-court finding of
unconstitutional vote dilution on evidence that is difficult to distinguish from evidence that a plurality of the Court in Mobile rejected as insufficient to support such a finding.103 It appears that,
103. See suprm text accompanying notes 31-34.
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in place of any discriminatory effects approach, a majority of the
Court has settled on a discriminatory intent standard under which
minority plaintiffs have at least some chance of prevailing, or at
least under which appellate courts will not always reverse trial
court findings of unconstitutional vote dilution. Considering the
hostility the Court has shown to any mode of analysis deviating
from a strict requirement of discriminatory intent, 104 Rogers might
represent the best approach that civil rights lawyers could realistically hope to achieve.
Second, the next wave of vote-dilution cases will be litigated
under the discriminatory effects standard of amended section 2,
which differs from that proposed by Blacksher and Menefee,
rather than under constitutional theories. 105 If amended section 2
receives a proper judicial interpretation, minority plaintiffs should
prevail in a number of cases, and future plaintiffs will have no
practical reason to argue for a constitutional standard different
from that of Rogers. These probable developments are unfortunate in one sense, because the standard proposed by Blacksher and
Menefee seems superior to that of amended section 2, which
among other things places enormous discretion in the district
104. See, e.g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
105. The version of amended section 2 adopted by the House of Representatives,
but rejected by the Senate in favor of the version that was enacted into law,
provided:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision [to deny or abridge] in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth
in section 4(f)(2). The fact that members of a minority group have not
been elected in numbers equal to the group's proportion of the population shall not in and of itself, constitute a violation of this section.
See H.R. Rep. No. 227, supra note 69, at 48 (emphasis in original to indicate proposed changes from existing law; brackets indicate language to be changed). In explaining the meaning of this amendment, the House report stated that "[i]t would
be illegal for an at-large election scheme for a particular state or local body to permit a bloc voting majority over a substantial period of time consistently to defeat
minority candidates or candidates identified with the interests of a racial or language minority." Id. at 30. The similarity between this sentence and the standard
proposed by Blacksher and Menefee, see supra text accompanying note 101, is so
striking that it cannot be coincidental. If the House version of amended section 2
had been enacted into law, the courts might have treated this sentence in the legislative history as authoritative in construing the amendment. The civil rights community gave up this possibility when it agreed to support the Senate version of
amended section 2, and thus perhaps the civil rights community made some small
compromises in achieving the enactment of amended section 2, see supra text accompanying notes 51-52. Courts rarely seize on one sentence in one committee report as a definitive guide to statutory construction, however, and the extensive
discussion in the Senate committee report concerning the meaning of amended section 2 should lead courts to the same results they would have reached under the
House version of the amendment in most, if not all, cases.
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judge handling the case and makes appellate review difficult.
However, the "bird in the hand" of amended section 2 is far superior to the slight possibility of convincing the Court to adopt the
approach of Blacksher and Menefee as a rule of constitutional law.
III.
The American approach to voting rights has operated on at
least two inconsistent levels. One track is based on the simple ideology that the citizenry's right to vote preserves all their other
rights. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. subscribed to this view, and
saw the vote as providing the minority community with the ability
to protect itself. It is reported that Chief Justice Warren felt the
same: he chose Baker v. Carr,106 the precursor to Reynolds, as his
most important constitutional decision "because he believed that if
each of us has an equal vote, we are equally armed with the indispensable means to make our views felt."107
This philosophy, which permeates the "one person, one vote"
concept of Reynolds, is linked inexorably to the vision of America
as the great melting pot. In this nation of minorities, give all citizens the vote and therefore the same political weapon, so the theory goes, and let them fight out their problems in the pluralistic
poltical arena; the resulting political compromises will not systematically favor any person or group to the exclusion of others, and
all citizens will be sufficiently protected in the political struggle.
Over time, it is said, the melting-pot phenomenon will homogenize
the citizenry, bring minorities into the heart of the American
political and economic process, and place sufficient political power
in the hands of minorities so that they can fully protect themselves against any residual discrimination. In its most simplistic
form, this ideology sees all citizens as fungible once they are free
to register and to vote for candidates of their choice.
This scenario is a myth, both historically and currently. It is
plain beyond doubt that it ignores the warping effect of racial prejudice as well as the legitimate interests of persons of different cultural heritages to develop their own approaches to participating in
public life. It does not even accurately reflect its prototypic example, the way in which European immigrants in nineteenth century
America supposedly became assimilated in melting-pot fashion.
The best structural friend those immigrants had was ward elections--which promote heterogeneity, not homogeneity. When im106. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

107. William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 492-93 (1977).
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migrants and their offspring achieved political power in American
cities, the white business elite reacted with the "Progressive" notion of at-large electoral schemes, which were adopted at least in
part to dilute immigrant political power.' 08 It remains true today
that, when bloc voting by the white majority is severe and the
electoral structure-for example, at-large elections-provides a
winner-take-all opportunity to the majority, the minority community is disenfranchised. In this situation, the right to vote does not
only fail to preserve all other rights, it is essentially meaningless.
Minority citizens perceive this fact, and their disproportionately
low voting rate is a rational response to it.
A second, more realistic approach to the right to vote grew
out of a recognition of these facts. This approach seeks to guarantee that minority groups are not fenced out of the political arena
by electoral structures that substantially dilute their vote. When
the courts proved reluctant to embrace this conception of the right
to vote, Congress reacted by amending section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. That statute promotes a new vision of the melting-pot
theory under which the minority community has a right to be
thrown in the pot and, perhaps, retain some of its essential flavor.
That approach may seem bold and unwise to judges who persist in
the simple melting-pot view and see protections for distinct minority groups as a barrier to social progress. 109
Yet even the new statutory remedy for minority vote dilution
envisions the vote as indirectly preservative of other rights.
Rather than guaranteeing any policy outcomes favorable to the minority community, amended section 2 simply seeks to provide that
community with a fighting chance to win some benefits in the
political arena. The new statute continues old traditions by refusing to attack social problems directly and by internalizing social
disputes into established political channels. 10 In addition, the
statute reflects the same philosophy that led the courts to label
certain individual rights of freedom against the state as fundamental while refusing to place affirmative obligations upon the state
that would often more dramatically benefit minorities."'
108. See supra sources cited note 77.
109. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 651-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 186-87 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
110. Cf the penultimate sentence in Justice Marshall's dissent in Mobile: "If
this Court refuses to honor our long-recognized principle that the Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination,'. . . it cannot
expect the victims of discrimination to respect political channels of seeking redress." 446 U.S. at 141 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
111. Consider the comment of John Hart ElyExperience suggests that in fact there will be a systematic bias in judi-
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Is the fundamental ideology supporting the American approach to voting rights misguided? Minorities have come a long
way in American politics. Yet, can we assume that outlawing some
demonstrably discriminatory electoral structures will substantially
enhance minority political power and result in a more favorable allocation of public resources to the minority community? 112 The alternative, more direct and radical methods of changing existing
power relationships in American society, is, it is needless to say,
not likely to happen through existing political institutions.
Yet amended section 2 is not simply another liberal effort to
effect incremental social change by tinkering at the margins of our
political institutions. To be sure, Congress' overwhelming support
for the amendment to section 2 can be simply explained by the
power of the ideology supporting voting rights and by the widespread understanding that fair allocation of voting power is a substitute for fundamental social change. It may also reflect that the
civil rights community spent much of its limited political influence
to achieve the passage of the amendment. If properly interpreted,
however, amended section 2, is, by American standards, a surprisingly powerful national intrusion into state and local affairs. To
borrow the language of my colleague Gerald Torres from a different context, the statute is not simply a typical liberal effort "to
change the complexion of institutions while leaving the structure
of those institutions intact."113 It has the potential to change a
number of facially neutral local political structures in the name of
cial choice of fundamental values, unsurprisingly in favor of the values
of the upper-middle, professional class from which most lawyers and
judges . . . are drawn. People understandably think that what is important to them is what is important, and people like us are no exception. Thus the list of values the Court and the commentators have
tended to enshrine as fundamental is a list with which readers of this
book will have little trouble identifying: expression, association, education, academic freedom, the privacy of the home, personal autonomy
....
But watch most fundamental-rights theorists start edging toward the door when someone mentions jobs, food, or housing those
are important, sure, but they aren't fundamental.
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 58-59 (1980) (footnotes omitted; emphasis
in original).
112. That there is a positive relationship between minority electoral participation and governmental responsiveness to minority concerns seems intuitive, but is
by no means certain. Minority Vote Dilution contains one essay that suggests that
Black voting does influence the distribution of public resources at the local level.
See Morris, supra note 2, at 271-85. The classic study on the overall relationship
between political participation and policy responsiveness suggests that "the vote in
its aggregate effects is perhaps the most important means of citizen control because
it can keep pressure on leaders." Sidney Verba & Norman Nie, Participation in
America 326 (1972).
113. Gerald Torres & James Morales, Book Review, 7 Chicano L. Rev. 125, 126
(1984).
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racial justice. Even if public policy is not significantly altered by
these changes, amended section 2 is a useful precedent for holding
the federal government responsible to intervene in intensely local
affairs to promote the goals of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments.
Moreover, amended section 2 somewhat protects minorities
against the risks inherent in the present shift from federal to state
and local control over public spending. In the 1960s, the federal
government pumped billions of dollars into local social programs.
Control over those programs rested at the federal level, where minority influence was greater than in many localities. Today, federal money flows to state and local governments with few strings
attached, and federal control is minimal. Amended section 2 could
provide minorities with greater opportunity to influence how the
states and localities use these funds.
To be sure, if the goal were to promote social change at more
than just an incremental rate, federal intervention should be directed toward the ends of policy, not toward the structure by
which policy is made. But identifying and formulating the policy
changes necessary to achieve major social change would be intensely controversial, and an overall federal solution could not
take account of local concerns. The federal intervention embodied
in amended section 2 has a more modest, but still substantial and
worthwhile goal. Whether that goal is achieved to any meaningful
extent remains to be seen. And, even if structural reform of some
local governments does result, we must still question whether it
will bring any substantial benefits to the minority community.
Amended section 2 may represent the practical limit to which
federal intervention into state and local affairs is likely to occur in
the present American political system. Thus, the answers to these
questions will perhaps measure the extent to which minority goals
can be achieved in the best of all politically feasible worlds. If this
is so, all eyes in the civil rights community---as well as those in
other parts of society concerned with racial justice-will focus on
the judicial treatment of minority voting rights in the years ahead.

